

OJCS-1269-74
9 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ORACLE Status Report [REDACTED]

STATINTL

STATINTL

1. On 29 August 1974, [REDACTED] briefed OJCS management and members of the ORACLE technical team. [REDACTED] did most of the briefing.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

2. [REDACTED] reviewed the program from its beginning in June 1973. He noted that there were many problems in the first six months due to starting up the program, understaffing by [REDACTED] and his hiring of a software manager that did not perform satisfactorily. (This first software manager was released in September and the present software manager, [REDACTED] was hired.)

STATINTL

[REDACTED] stated that during the next six months the program started to jell. The Backfill test was passed and the final design review was held in March 74. During this time period, personnel from both parties left and caused a perturbation in the progress. [REDACTED] stated that from April to the present he felt that the program had been going very well, but the system had grown and the Release 1 document was slow in developing. [REDACTED] stated that he got back into the program in April and started to work on the specifications and it just took until now. He admitted that it should have been done earlier, but it was not and that was a fact.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

3. [REDACTED] then started to discuss the schedules and future of the program. He stated that the hardware had slipped again and would not be delivered until late January or early February. Mr. Fitzwater questioned the slip and [REDACTED] stated that due to parts slippage some of the schedules were compressed and then there was just not enough personnel available to complete all aspects of the tape dubbing buffer. (This is the feature that will be used for tape to tape copies). [REDACTED] stated that the original hardware schedules had slipped a total of six months and this has had some effect on the software. He also mentioned that System Concepts, which is developing the channel simulators has slipped very much.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL This particular slip has not had too much impact, but since System Concepts is understaffed, there have been times when [REDACTED] could not use the system due to the channel simulator being down.

STATINTL 4. [REDACTED] then went into status and schedules for software. He stated that the EDCP software was stable. He said that the SCP software was working but not stable and that he estimated that it would be 3-4 weeks before it would become stable. He admitted that the SCP software had slipped from June schedules. Mr. [REDACTED] then started to discuss the size of the software. He stated that [REDACTED] had proposed 70,000 bytes and currently had about 50,000. They anticipate the system will be much larger than 70,000 bytes. He admitted that there was no change from the high level functional specs in the RFP but that the second level effort to implement them was much larger and much better. He then discussed the Release 1 document and the fact that [REDACTED] felt there was much more in this than they had originally proposed. He admitted that there were still areas that were not defined as well as he would like and that every time he sat down with the government, they kept adding functions and it was difficult to really size the effort. The meeting then went into a discussion of interpretation. [REDACTED] stated that he did not think the Agency wanted a production system. [REDACTED] questioned that and it was revealed that he really meant that there are different levels of production systems and he did not realize that we wanted as much MIS, Security or Recovery. The area of recovery was discussed to point out the difficulty of trying to know how much was enough. [REDACTED] pointed out that there was not too much in the RFP in regards to recovery and he could easily interpret that to mean that we did not want too much recovery.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL 5. [REDACTED] then stated what alternatives he saw at the time:

STATINTL a. [REDACTED] can deliver a complete VM/370 system by April with present funding.

b. VM/370 and an Initial Operating Capability system by April for an additional \$175K.

STATINTL c. VM/370 and complete BATCH by August for an additional [REDACTED]

STATINTL

There was much discussion about how the numbers were arrived at and how come it would cost so much and was recognized so late in the program. [REDACTED] presented the original [REDACTED] manpower charts to show that they had intended for the level of work to go down early in 1975 and that at this time it looked like it was going up. He also pointed out that the [REDACTED] subcontract was costing them much money. He again pointed out that he could not really get this estimate until he had the TMS 2 System Specifications and that it was really still not complete. It was mentioned that it was really an [REDACTED] job and what had really happened was that [REDACTED] did not have sufficient manpower to really get into certain areas at this time and that was the reason that there was still some areas that did not have the required level of detail.

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL
STATINTL

STATINTL

6. [REDACTED] then presented his cost charts to show that [REDACTED] was going to be at 80% expenditure by the end of August on the CPFF contract. There was discussion as to why [REDACTED] had not mentioned this before and it was pointed out that [REDACTED] is not legally required to announce this level until it actually occurs. This did not satisfy all who were present. [REDACTED] gave the following figures:

STATINTL

STATINTL

STATINTL

- a. FFP [REDACTED]
- b. CPFF [REDACTED]

STATINTL

7. [REDACTED] then put forth the following recommendations:

- a. If no more money complete VM/370
- b. If money, we should reevaluate our requirements and develop a new release 1 document to reflect those requirements.


c. Establish a better technical interface between Agency and [REDACTED] to insure that there is not so much spurious work performed.

8. In summary, [REDACTED] accepted responsibility for not getting the Release 1 document finished earlier and thus recognizing the requirement for more money. He felt the system had grown in sophistication and implementation

STATINTL

STATINTL

even though we were still very close to the RFP system. He said there was not enough money to complete both VM and BATCH and gave estimates as to what he felt it would cost. He asked the Agency to reconsider what it needed and to establish a new course of action.



STATINTL

Chief,
Mass Storage System Branch
SED

Copies to: DDS&T Contract Office
ORACLE Notebook
C/OPS/OJCS
C/USD/OJCS
DD/OJCS
✓ D/OJCS

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS
1	<i>D/WCS</i>			
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH	
	COMMENT		FILE	
	CONCURRENCE	X	INFORMATION	
				PREPARE REPLY
				RECOMMENDATION
				RETURN
				SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
-----------------------------------	------

--	--	--	--

Approved For Release 2001/05/07 : CIA-RDP81-00573R000500040001-0